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Abstract. Microarchitectural cross-VM covert channels are software-
launched attacks which exploit multi-tenant environments’ shared hard-
ware. They enable transmitting information from a compromised system
when the information flow policy does not allow to do so. These attacks
represent a threat to the confidentiality and integrity of data processed
and stored on cloud platforms. Although potentially severe, covert chan-
nels tend to be overlooked due to an allegedly strong adversary model.
The literature focuses on mechanisms for encoding information through
timing variations, without addressing practical considerations. Further-
more, the field lacks a realistic evaluation framework. Covert channels
are usually compared to each other using the channel capacity. While
a valuable performance metric, the capacity is inadequate to assess the
severity of an attack. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study
on the severity of microarchitectural covert channels in public clouds.
State-of-the-art attacks are evaluated against the Common Vulnerabil-
ity Scoring System in its most recent version (CVSS v3.1). The study
shows that a medium severity score of 5.0 is achieved. In comparison,
the SSLv3 POODLE (CVE-2014-3566) and OpenSSL Heartbleed (CVE-
2014-0160) vulnerabilities achieved respective scores of 3.1 and 7.5. As
such, the paper successfully demonstrates that covert channels are not
theoretical threats, and that they require the immediate attention of the
community. Furthermore, we devise a new and independent scoring sys-
tem, the Covert Channel Scoring System (CCSS). The scoring of related
works under the CCSS shows that cache-based covert channels, although
more and more popular, are the least practical ones to deploy. We encour-
age authors of future cross-VM covert channel attacks to include a CCSS
metric in their study, in order to account for deployment constraints and
provide a fair point of comparison for the adversary model.
Keywords: Covert channel · Microarchitectural attack · Cloud privacy
· Vulnerability study.
1 Introduction
The multi-tenant nature of cloud platforms prompts concerns over the confi-
dentiality and integrity of data [31]. When multiple virtual machines (VMs) are
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scheduled on the same hardware platform, they compete with each other for pro-
cessor resources. Such conflicts can delay the execution of certain instructions,
resulting in timing variations to occur during the execution of an application.
These timing variations can in turn be exploited by two colluding entities in
order to encode and decode binary information. Microarchitectural covert chan-
nel attacks allow tunneling information out of a compromised system when the
security policy does not allow doing so. A sending-end is embedded into the vic-
tim’s environment, and transmits information to the receiving-end located in the
attacker’s environment. Furthermore, covert channel attacks are relevant when
there is no other mean of leaking information in a non-conspicuous manner, e.g.
as part of an advanced persistent threat malware. We note that side channel
attacks, which rely on an accidental leakage of information from the victim, are
beyond the scope of this study.
Microarchitectural covert channels allegedly rely on a strong adversary model.
First, the attacker must infect the victim’s instance with a malicious sending-
end. Second, the attacker requires co-locating her instance on the same hardware
platform as the victim’s instance. Researchers devising these attacks tend to fo-
cus on new mechanisms for generating timing variations, rather than addressing
deployment constraints. Indeed, the trend is to propose covert channels that are
always faster and more robust, while assuming an ideal scenario for the attacker.
Meanwhile, experts responsible for implementing security policies are free to re-
brand microarchitectural covert channels as non-practical exploits, due to the
above-mentioned challenges.
This paper investigates the operational constraints of launching a covert
channel attack across Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) instances. To do so, a
measurement study on the practicality and severity of these attacks is conducted.
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is used as a support for our
analysis. Criteria are discussed in the context of microarchitectural attacks and
potentially re-interpreted. Our study shows that microarchitectural covert chan-
nels achieve a medium severity score of up to 5.0, discarding the assumption
that covert channels aren’t practical. In comparison, the MySQL Stored SQL
Injection vulnerability [2] achieved a medium severity scrore of 6.4 (CVSS v3.1),
and was patched shortly after its disclosure. To this day, there are still no prac-
tical countermeasures against severe covert channels released several years ago
[30,21]. Secondly, we propose a new evaluation framework dedicated to microar-
chitectural covert channels, the Covert Channel Scoring System (CCSS). This
framework evaluates state-of-the-art attacks, and outlines the effect of opera-
tional constraints on the severity score. Among other findings, this evaluation
shows that cache-based covert channels achieve the lowest severity scores, de-
spite being increasingly popular. Overall, the paper reveals the existence of a
growing gap between academic efforts and the commercial ecosystem.
The contributions of this paper are summarised as follows:
– We propose the first comprehensive study on the practicality and severity of
microarchitectural covert channels in IaaS, resulting in CVSS scores ranging
from 4.2 to 5.0.
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– We devise a new and independent Covert Channel Scoring System, so as to
provide a fair and realistic evaluation framework for future research.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a background on cloud
services, processor architecture, and defines covert channel attacks. In Section
3, the criteria discussed in this paper are defined. Section 4 rates criteria which
can be evaluated generically. Section 5 discusses state-of-the-art covert channels,
and provides an individual rating for the remaining criteria. Section 6 details the
resulting scores. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Infrastructure-as-a-Service
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) delivers internet-accessible storage, process-
ing, and network resources. The end-user controls every component inside the
virtual machine, while the service provider manages servers and orchestrators (or
containers). Customers remain in control of the (sensitive) data being processed
within the VM, including data from any other service built upon it, i.e. platform
or software. Also, the user can interact with the instance as with any other ma-
chine (e.g. root access, hardware selection APIs, etc). IaaS minimises the trust
that needs to be extended to the cloud provider, and emphasises responsibilities
mostly on the customer.
2.2 Processor Organisation
We use the term processor to refer to the processor die, which includes the cores
and the last-level cache (LLC). The core contains the CPU along with the level-2
Fig. 1. Processor overview (NUMA configuration).
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(L2), level-1 instruction (L1-I) and data (L1-D) caches. The memory bus refers
to the front side bus present on older microarchitectures. Since the Nehalem
microarchitecture, Intel processors mainly rely on a non-uniform memory ac-
cess (NUMA) configuration. As a result, the memory bus has been removed,
and memory controllers (MC) have been integrated into the processor die. The
interconnect allows a processor accessing a region of DRAM that is managed
by another processor. Figure 1 provides a representation of a multi-processor
multi-core system in the NUMA configuration.
2.3 Scope of the Evaluation
Microarchitectural covert channels exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation
of a processor’s architecture. In contrast, network covert channels abuse network
protocols. This study focuses on the former case. Also, not all covert channels
have malicious intents. Nevertheless, we use the terms covert channel and covert
channel attack interchangeably, for the sake of simplicity. We assume that a
covert channel has a malicious nature. Microarchitectural covert channels differ
from microarchitectural side channels in the attack scenario. Although they share
the same underlying mechanisms, side channels rely on an accidental leakage of
information from the victim, and they do not require compromising the victim’s
environment a priori. Side channel attacks are beyond the scope of our work.
Finally, a covert channel does not necessarily allow communication across VMs.
Because this paper focuses on the threat against IaaS, only cross-VM covert
channels are considered. In parallel, this study could be applied to environments
similar to IaaS, e.g. private clouds. This evaluation is specific to IaaS, and does
not account for variations in similar environments. Table 1 surveys relevant
covert channel attacks. We note that the respective channel capacities have been
calculated here under the binary symmetric model [23].
3 Criteria of Evaluation
This section lists the criteria used to assess the impact of malicious covert chan-
nels in IaaS environments. We use the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
in its most recent version (CVSS v3.1) [3] as a base for our evaluation met-
rics. The CVSS is an open industry standard that is widely used in the security
community in order to assist responses to threats. While other evaluation frame-
works exist, these have been adapting the traditional calculation of the CVSS
to specific industrial environments. Certain criteria can be directly applied to
all covert channels (C1 to C8), while others are specific to the covert channel
considered (C9 to C12). We note that the criteria C11 and C12 are not part of
the CVSS framework. These have been selected in order to provide an optimal
representation of cross-VM covert channels’ adversary model.
C1 Attack vector evaluates the proximity between the attacker and its target.
This criterion can be rated as “network” for remote interaction, “adjacent”
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Table 1. Cross-VM covert channel attacks.
Attack Exploited resource Bitrate Error Capacity
[22] Last-level cache 0.2 bps - -
[32] Last-level cache 3.2 bps 9.28% 1.77 bps
[30] Memory bus 343 bps 0.39% 330 bps
[14] Last-level cache 1.2 Mbps 22% 287 kbps
[16] Last-level cache 751 bps 5.7% 514 bps
[21] DRAM row-buffer 596 kbps 0.4% 573 kbps
[17] Last-level cache 45.25 kbps 0% 45.25 kbps
[24] Memory order buffer 1.49 Mbps ∼5% 1.06 Mbps
[23] Memory controller 150 bps 7.8% 90.7 bps
when the attacker needs physical or logical proximity with the target (e.g.
Bluetooth), “local” if it relies on user interaction (e.g. social engineering),
or “physical” when physical manipulation is required.
C2 Attack complexity assesses the difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability once
access to the targeted platform is gained, ranked either as “low” when no
specialised access condition exists, or “high” when the attack requires a
significant amount of preparation such that it cannot be performed at will.
We discuss under this criterion the VM co-location problem.
C3 User interaction indicates whether human interaction other than the ad-
versary is required. As such, this criteria can be rated as either “none” or
“required”. We discuss under this criterion the trojan insertion problem.
C4 Scope assesses the impact that a vulnerability might have on components
other than the one affected by the vulnerability. This metric accounts for
the overall system damage caused by the exploitation of the reported vul-
nerability. Scope can be rated as “changed” when a scope change occurs, or
“unchanged” otherwise.
C5 Confidentiality impact assesses the severity of a disclosure of information,
as well as the quantity of information that can be leaked. This criterion can
be rated as “none”, “low” when the attacker can only access a small amount
of data and loss of this data does not result in serious consequences, or “high”
otherwise.
C6 Integrity impact measures the attacker’s capability to tamper with the
victim’s data. It can be rated as “none”, “low” when the amount of data
that can be modified is limited and modification of this data does not result
in serious consequences, or “high” otherwise.
C7 Exploit code maturity evaluates the state of an attack, from a conceptual
exploit to a fully autonomous malware. Exploitability can be rated as “un-
proven”, “proof-of-concept” when the attack has been demonstrated but is
not practical, “functional” when the exploit works in most systems where the
vulnerability is present but is still not widely accessible, or “high” otherwise.
C8 Report confidence assesses the credibility of the source which reported the
vulnerability. This criterion is rated as “confirmed” when originating from
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a publication, “reasonable” when multiple non-official sources reported the
vulnerability, or “unknown” when a single non-official source is involved.
C9 Privileges required evaluates the level of privileges that the adversary
must acquire before launching the attack. This criterion can be rated as
“none”, “low” if privileges that allow performing basic user operations are
required (e.g. changing settings), or “high” for administrative privileges. We
note that this criterion is relative to the covert channel’s sending-end, con-
cealed in the victim’s environment.
C10 Remediation level accounts for potential countermeasures. This criterion
can be rated as “unavailable”, “workaround” for non-official mitigation,
“temporary fix” for official but not permanent countermeasures, or “official
fix” otherwise.
C11 Hardware configuration specifies the attacker’s proximity with regard to
the victim’s VM. Covert channels can require both VMs to be scheduled on
the same core, on the same processor, or on the same system. Accordingly,
hardware configuration can be rated as “core”, “processor”, or “system”. A
“system” rating makes for a higher severity score.
C12 Initialisation evaluates whether a covert channel attack requires the sender
and receiver to perform an initialisation phase before leaking the victim’s
data. This criterion can be rated as “mandatory” or “optional”. In the latter
case, the covert channel remains functional in the absence of an initialisation
phase, which increases the severity score. The absence of initialisation eases
the deployment of the attack and decreases visible side-effects (e.g. large
memory footprint).
The confidentiality, integrity, and availability requirements (CR, IR, AR)
allow tuning the CVSS evaluation depending on the targeted asset. In the case
of a cloud platform, the three requirements are equally important. Therefore,
we set these to “medium”, i.e. their default value. Furthermore, the availability
impact is rated to “none”. Covert channel attacks do not aim to compromise the
availability of a computing environment.
4 Evaluation of Generic Criteria (C1-C8)
This section discusses the criteria for which the rating can be applied generically
to the cross-VM covert channel attacks surveyed in Table 1.
C1. The attack vector is “local”. The sending-end is a malicious program running
inside the instance of the victim. This trojan must be inserted either using social
engineering, or by corrupting the machine image. Independently of the chosen
attack vector, user interaction is required. The attack vector is further discussed
under requirement C3.
C2. Attack complexity is rated as “high”. Prior to launching the attack, the
adversary must achieve VM co-location, independently of the covert channel
considered. Cloud services’ application programming interfaces do not allow an
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attacker to place an instance at will on a chosen physical machine. VM co-
location consists in moving the attacker’s VM until it is executing on the same
hardware platform as the victim’s. Several proposals suggested using networking
utilities to map the internal network topology of the data center, allowing an
attacker to place two instances on the same platform [22,10,33,25]. Microarchi-
tectural covert channels can later be used to find out whether co-residency is
achieved at core-level, package-level, or system-level. While these approaches re-
quire some knowledge of the network topology, an adversary can choose instead
to directly apply microarchitectural covert channels to detect co-residency. In
a purely microarchitectural co-residency attack, the sending-end can broadcast
messages on the covert channel, until a receiving-end picks up. Thus targeted
co-residency is still possible without access to a reliable network topology of the
data centre. Recently, Atya et al. [7] successfully demonstrated this approach on
AWS EC2, using the memory bus and the cache as communication mediums.
C3. User interaction is rated as “required”. The Amazon Web Service Elastic
Compute Cloud (AWS EC2) service is a practical example of means to compro-
mise a victim’s instance before its deployment. Amazon Machine Images (AMIs)
are the basic unit of the EC2 service. An AMI contains the OS along with li-
braries, applications, and other components which personalise the instance. Be-
fore deploying a VM, a user must choose an AMI, and set permissions for its
AWS account(s). AMI selection presents a unique vulnerability: anyone with an
AWS account can customise and share an AMI. As a result, an attacker can con-
ceal and distribute a trojan across a large pool of users. While Amazon warns its
customers against such practise, it doesn’t forbid it. Also, because the AMI con-
tains a tremendous amount of code, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible)
to uncover malicious code once it is embedded into the image. Whether trojan
insertion is performed using social-engineering, or via machine image corruption,
specific actions must be performed by the victim.
C4. The scope metric is rated as “unchanged”. The mechanism responsible for
enforcing access control over the vulnerable component, also known as the secu-
rity authority, depends on the form of the trojan. For example, if the sending-end
is part of a user application (e.g. plugin), the vulnerable component is the af-
fected application (e.g. web-browser) and the security authority is the guest
operating system, responsible for enforcing isolation between user applications.
However, the covert channel attack does not allow accessing the data of other
applications running in the same guest operating system. The same reasoning
holds if the sending-end takes the form of a malicious kernel module. The affected
component becomes the guest operating system, and the security authority be-
comes the hypervisor. The sending-end would be able to leak all the information
of the guest operating system, but it would not allow accessing the data of other
guests under the same hypervisor. Therefore, the fact that data is exfiltrated
across virtual machines does not constitute a change of scope. The sole purpose
of a covert channel attack is to exfiltrate information, or carry out modifications
as instructed by the other communicating entity. Any exploit built on top of
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the covert channel attack (e.g. privilege escalation) is beyond the scope of this
study.
C5. Confidentiality impact is rated as “high”. Covert channels intend to leak a
selected amount of information rather than the entire set of system files. How-
ever, a successful attack against a public cloud instance can have a significant
impact on a victim, such as theft of proprietary information, leakage of per-
sonal data, or theft of cryptographic keys. We note that covert channels are
only relevant when there is no alternative mean of leaking information in a
non-conspicuous manner, e.g. to avoid generating network traffic and associated
logs [5]. As such, covert channels constitute an ideal basis for advanced persis-
tent threats, where the attacker employs state-of-the-art techniques in order to
maintain long-term intrusion and data exfiltration capabilities. Such an attacker
has other incentives than simple financial gain [12].
C6. Integrity impact is rated as “low”. The attacker can issue modifications
to be applied to the victim’s environment, although this requires bi-directional
communication, as well as the ability to instruct data tampering operations.
Such a covert channel was demonstrated by Maurice et al. [17], who managed to
establish a rogue SSH connection between two AWS EC2 instances. Data mod-
ification is therefore possible, however it remains a specific case, the primarily
objective being data extraction.
C7. Exploit code maturity is rated as “proof-of-concept”. The state-of-the-art
covert channels surveyed in this paper all demonstrate a functional attack in a
virtualised environment. However, researchers rarely disclose their full source-
code. Therefore, current microarchitectural covert channels are not directly ap-
plicable without a skilled attacker.
C8. As per the CVSS specification [3], disclosure of an exploit in external events
such as publications automatically rates the report confidence as “confirmed”.
A research publication is considered an official source which is corroborated by
multiple experts.
To the best of our knowledge, there hasn’t been any reported exploit related
to cross-VM microarchitectural covert channels. Therefore, a universal approach
is adopted in this study. We note that the CVSS v3.1 also provides a set of
modified base metrics, allowing the analyst to override base metrics so as to fit
the victim’s environment specifically. For instance, if the data that was leaked
was not considered sensitive, the confidentiality impact can be overwritten to
“low”. Similarly, if the covert channel allowed modifying data used in critical
decision making processes, the integrity impact can be overwritten to “high”.
5 Evaluation of Covert Channel-Specific Criteria
(C9-C12)
In this section, covert channel attacks surveyed in Table 1 are analysed individ-
ually in order to proceed with the criteria evaluation. Results are reported in
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Table 3, along with the CVSS and CCSS scores for each attack. We note that
the two scores are independent from each other. Additional details on scoring
are provided in Section 6.
5.1 Memory Order Buffer
The memory order buffer (MOB) attack [24] exploits a side-effect of write-after-
read hazards, called 4k-aliasing. This effect occurs whenever the lower twelve
bits of the addresses contained in the load and store registers match, i.e. there
is a data dependency between the load and the out-of-order store. This causes
the load operation to be re-issued, resulting in the load/store bandwidth to
drop. Authors leverage 4k-aliasing to create a covert communication between two
hyperthreads. The sender either fills the store buffer with page-aligned addresses
to transmit a one, or empties the store buffer to transmit a zero. Concurrently,
the receiver probes load operations on every page-aligned addresses. When the
load/store bandwidth drops, the receiver will observe a higher latency.
This effect is exploitable only at the thread-level, as it is linked to the load
and store buffers located within the CPU. Neither the sender nor the receiver
processes require root privileges, and the covert channel works across processes.
Therefore, the sending-end can be embedded into a different program than the
receiving-end. Both entities need to be scheduled on the same physical core.
With regard to countermeasures, authors acknowledge that disabling SMT is
a straightforward way of mitigating the vulnerability. However, they also argue
that “hyperthreading is expected to become more popular on IaaS platforms in
the near future in order to keep them affordable”. Indeed, SMT remains available
on dedicated instances or for general-purpose workloads.
5.2 Last-Level Cache
LLC-based covert channels [22,32,14,16,17] derive from the Prime+Probe tech-
nique [18]. The receiver initialises the cache by filling it with its own cache lines,
waits for the sender to execute, and probes its accesses to the same cache lines.
If the sender chooses to modify the cache sets of the receiver, the latter will ex-
perience a slower access to its cache lines. Prime+Probe relies on the existence
of congruent addresses between the sender and receiver, i.e. virtual addresses
that map to the same cache set.
Identifying congruent addresses requires translating virtual pointers into phys-
ical addresses, which is performed by accessing the privileged page tables. Al-
ternatively, entities can use the page offset of huge pages (e.g. 2 MB) as it is not
translated, and it is long enough to include index bits. The communicating en-
tities need to agree on a set of congruent addresses, which cannot be performed
in the absence of an existing communication channel. In order to cope with this
issue, Maurice et al. [17] suggested using a jamming agreement. Independently of
the chosen strategy, LLC-based attacks are not functional without an initialisa-
tion phase. LLC-based covert channels are limited to cross-core communication.
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Several cloud-oriented mitigation techniques were proposed to tackle LLC-
based timing channels, such as cache partitioning or noise injection [13,9,11,26].
Intel Xeon processors support a similar mechanism, i.e. Intel’s Cache Allocation
Technology [4], which allows locking down portions of the LLC during execution,
and ultimately defeat Prime+Probe attacks [13]. With a different approach,
an auditing technique is suggested by Zhang et al. [34] which consists of using
the performance monitoring unit to detect abnormal behaviour.
5.3 DRAM Row-Buffer
The DRAM addressing covert channel [21] exploits the DRAM bank row-buffer
to create timing variations on uncached memory accesses. The sending-end al-
locates memory, and performs memory accesses either in the cache or in the
DRAM. When the sender accesses the DRAM, it causes the row-buffer to be up-
dated with the sender’s row. Concurrently, the receiver accesses the same DRAM
bank as the sender. If the sender evicted the receiver’s row from the row-buffer,
a row-miss occurs resulting in a higher latency.
Pessl et al. [21] relied on a privileged adversary model in order to access
the pagemap file. We note that it is trivial to extend the original author’s threat
model to remote and unprivileged adversaries. One entity can simply write zeroes
and ones on a random memory location, and the other entity scans its memory
address space to detect the bit pattern, i.e. consecutive row-hits and row-misses.
This approach also enables implementing a covert channel without knowledge of
the DRAM addressing function, at the cost of an initialisation phase. This covert
channel has the advantage that the communicating entities do not necessarily
need to be scheduled on the same processor, as the DRAM memory is shared at
a system-level via the interconnect.
Auditing can be used as a mitigation strategy. Indeed, the constant probing to
DRAM results in a significant amount of cache-misses, observable by cache-miss
counters. Alternatively, these authors proposed restricting access to the clflush
instruction, which would render the covert channel harder to implement. Semal
et al. [23] also suggest enforcing a close-page policy in order to inhibit the effect
of the row-buffer.
5.4 Memory Controller
Semal et al. [23] proposed modulating the load on the channel scheduler in order
to induce timing variations in the receiver’s memory accesses to DRAM. The
sender allocates three memory pages, and then reads one byte either in each of
the three pages, or in a single page. The receiver observes a higher latency when
the sender is increasing the load on the channel scheduler.
Authors demonstrated the attack both with and without privileges. The
communicating-entities need to agree on a memory channel. As in the row-buffer
attack, this can be achieved by having the sender broadcasting his position. Be-
cause the memory controller is accessible at a system level, this attack could
be extended to multi-processor configurations. Further research is required to
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evaluate the impact of accessing memory regions in external NUMA nodes on
the latency variations induced by the sender.
The memory controller covert channel can be addressed with the same coun-
termeasures as the row-buffer one, at the exception of the page policy. Alter-
natively, the controller can be redesigned in order to enforce temporal [27] or
spatial isolation.
5.5 Memory Bus
Wu et al. [30] devised a covert channel based on the memory bus. Authors sug-
gested using atomic operations on exotic memory operations, i.e. operations on
cache line-crossing memory regions, in order to trigger a bus lock emulation. The
sender either performs an exotic access, or remains idle. Meanwhile the receiver
probes its uncached memory accesses. A high latency is observed whenever the
sender accesses exotic memory regions.
This attack allows cross-core communication on NUMA architectures, cross-
processor communication on front side bus architectures, and it does not require
privileges. Furthermore, it is functional without an initialisation phase.
Wu et al. suggest monitoring the cache-miss memory bus lock counters in or-
der to detect performance anomalies at runtime with minimal overhead. Another
suggestion consists of enforcing a policy where each tenant can only be neigh-
bour with one other tenant [30]. This approach renders covert channel attacks
almost impractical, however the operational cost remains an open-question.
5.6 Summary of Findings
C9. The CVSS v3.1 [3] specifies that exploits which rely on social engineering
can be rated as “none”. However, the works of Ristenpart et al. [22] and Xu et al.
[32] require accessing page tables in order to find congruent addresses, and are
thus rated as “high”. All remaining covert channels are feasible from a user-level
program. These are rated as “none”.
C10. The remediation level varies depending on the party that is enforcing
countermeasures. Table 2 shows that among the countermeasures proposed in
the literature, several rely on an alternative hardware design. This approach
has the benefit of being the most efficient, however it is also the hardest to
deploy. Furthermore, security by design tends to have a significant performance
cost which is not always justified. For instance, Wang et al. [27] suggested a
new design of the memory controller which enforces temporal isolation among
different security domains. While effective, this technique results in performance
cost of up to 150%. As a result, remediation strategies consisting of alternative
designs are evaluated as “unavailable”.
Other countermeasures have been proposed which can be taken directly by
the cloud customer. For example, Zhang et al. [35] devised the HomeAlone tech-
nique which allows cloud users detecting the presence of a LLC-based timing
channel. The victim continuously probes memory accesses to detect anomalies,
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Table 2. Remediation level (C10) criterion analysis.
C10 Hardware manufacturer Cloud provider Cloud customer
Workaround -
Software partitioning
[11], [8], [9]; Noise
injection [29], [26];
Auditing hardware
counters [34]
Probing memory
accesses [35];
Auditing hardware
counters [30]
Unavailable
Temporal isolation [27];
Spatial isolation [19], [20],
[29], [13]; Restricting
clflush [21]; Close-page
policy [23]
VM clusters [30] -
Temporary
fix
-
Disabling SMT [15];
Dedicated instances [1]
-
and takes reactive measures accordingly. Yet, this approach can result in a high
number of false positives depending on the workload. This type of strategy is
not official and cannot be generalised to all IaaS users. Therefore, remediation
level is rated as “workaround” at the cloud customer level.
The most practical means of deploying countermeasures is if they are en-
forced by the cloud provider. The AWS EC2 and GCE services propose a type
of instance where the user runs on a platform that is isolated from other users
[1,6]. Note that these have a significant cost, e.g. an on-demand EC2 a1.2xlarge
instance costs 0.204 USD per hour while a dedicated EC2 a1.2xlarge instance
costs 2.2162 USD per hour. This approach is valid for running a selected work-
load only. Cloud providers have reportedly encouraged the disabling of SMT
in order to prevent core-level timing channels [15]. We rate these strategies as
“temporary fix”, as they are recommended by vendors but are only applicable
to a set of instances. Researchers also advanced mitigation strategies which can
be implemented via the hypervisor. For example, Liu et al. [13] leverage Intel’s
Cache Allocation Technology to thwart Prime+Probe cache attacks. To the
best of our knowledge, this strategy is not applied by cloud providers. As a
result, this type of remediation is rated as “workaround”.
C11. Ristenpart et al. [22] and Xu et al. [32] use a busy-loop mechanism to
synchronise receiver and sender, implying that both VMs share CPU resources.
Therefore, these attacks do not meet the requirements for cross-core covert chan-
nels. Similarly, the memory order buffer attack [24] requires both entities to share
CPU resources. These attacks are set to “core”. Remaining LLC-based covert
channels are bound to the “processor” rating as the LLC cannot be shared across
processors. Note that, as defined in Section 2.2, we use the term processor to
refer to the entire processor die. Furthermore, while the memory controller at-
tack [23] exploits a system-level component, the authors didn’t demonstrate the
attack on a multi-processor system. Similarly, Wu et al [30] assigned different
virtual CPUs to each entity without specifying whether these were pinned to dis-
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Table 3. Summary of cross-VM covert channel attacks’ criteria evaluation and scoring.
Attack C9 C10 C11 C12 CVSS / CCSS
[22]* Privileged Workaround Core Mandatory 4.2 / 1.6
[32]* Privileged Workaround Core Mandatory 4.2 / 1.6
[30]† Unprivileged Unavailable Processor Optional 5.0 / 6.7
[14]* Unprivileged Workaround Processor Mandatory 4.9 / 4.3
[16]* Unprivileged Workaround Processor Mandatory 4.9 / 3.7
[21]¶ Unprivileged Unavailable System Mandatory 5.0 / 6.8
[17]* Unprivileged Workaround Processor Mandatory 4.9 / 3.8
[24]‡ Unprivileged Temporary fix Core Optional 4.8 / 5.7
[23]§ Unprivileged Workaround Processor Mandatory 4.9 / 4.7
*LLC, †Memory bus, ¶Row-buffer, ‡Memory order buffer, §Memory controller.
C1 = Local, C2 = High, C3 = Required, C4 = Unchanged, C5 = High, C6 = Low,
C7 = Proof-of-concept, C8 = Confirmed.
tinct hardware processors. These covert channels are also rated as “processor”.
Finally, the DRAM row-buffer [21] attack can transmit data across processors
as DRAM memory is shared at system-level. As such, it is rated as “system”.
C12. Only the memory bus [30] and the memory order buffer [24] covert channels
can be rated as “optional”. Every other covert channel requires an initialisation
phase, and are thus rated as “mandatory” for this criterion.
6 Severity Scores
6.1 Design of the CCSS Equations
In order to provide a classification of covert channels, we create a new scheme
which accounts for criteria C9, C10, C11, C12, and the channel capacity. These
criteria are specific to the covert channel considered, and provide a point of
comparison for the adversary model. The CCSS is by no means a representation
of the severity of the attack. Instead, it should be taken as a complement to the
CVSS which cannot solely be used to classify cross-VM covert channels.
Criteria scores have been selected such that the scoring equation is as uniform
as possible. That is, the five criteria all have the same weight. The motivation
behind this decision is that the importance of one factor over another is sub-
jective. For example, one could give a higher weight to the channel capacity,
arguing that communication speed and robustness is the most important. From
one perspective, this is true. A set of log, data, and application files of a password
manager (∼1 GB) would take 99 days 10 hours and 5 minutes at a bitrate of 1
Kb/s to be transmitted, and 2 hours and 23 minutes at a bitrate of 1Mb/s. Cloud
instances are rescheduled onto different platforms depending on resource avail-
ability and demand. Therefore, the communication speed is critical. However,
from another perspective, this is false. Faster communication rates are usually
achieved by covert channels that exploit microarchitectural components closer
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from the execution units, which can easily be addressed by existing countermea-
sures (i.e. disabling SMT), or that have been extensively studied and resulted
in multiple countermeasure proposals [8,9,11,13,26,28,29,36]. Thus faster covert
channels will not necessarily be practical.
Furthermore, improving an evaluation scheme is usually performed over time
by comparing the scores with the reality. For instance, the HeartBleed vulnera-
bility was given a medium severity score of 5.0 in CVSS v2. Yet, it could easily
be exploited and had significant consequences. It now has a high severity score
of 7.5 in the CVSS v3.1 To the best of our knowledge, no covert channel exploit
has been reported so far. Therefore, we consider that starting with an impartial
scoring equation for the CCSS is the best approach. The scoring equation is,
Score = 2 × (C9 + C10 + C11 + C12 + CapScore) (1)
Each CCSS criteria is given a value between 0 and 1: criterion C9 is scored 0 for
“Privileged” and 1 for “Unprivileged”; criterion C10 is scored 0 for “Temporary
fix”, 0.5 for “Workaround”, and 1 for “Unavailable”; criterion C11 is given a
score of 0 for “Core”, 0.5 for “Processor”, and 1 for “System”; C12 is scored 0
for “Mandatory” and 1 for ‘Optional”; the capacity score CapScore is modelled
as an affine function between the highest and lowest channel capacity observed
in this study, such that it outputs a score between 0 and 1,
CapScore = 1/(1.06e06 − 1.77) × Capacity (2)
The final CCSS score varies between 0 and 10. Again, the CCSS score is only
used for comparing covert channel attacks, and is complementary to the CVSS.
6.2 Results
Figure 2 represents the score of each covert channel under the CCSS and the
CVSS. Due to missing information, Ristenpart et al.’s attack [22] was assigned
an error rate of 22%, i.e. the maximum error rate observed in this study. Highest
Fig. 2. Scoring of cross-VM covert channel attacks under the CVSS and CCSS: (a) =
LLC [22], (b) = LLC [32], (c) = Memory bus [30], (d) = LLC [14], (e) = LLC [16],
(f) = Row-buffer [21], (g) = LLC [17], (h) = Memory order buffer [24], (i) = Memory
controller [23].
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scores are achieved by the memory bus [30] and DRAM row-buffer [21] covert
channels. Although not the most recent, these were able to reach high-speed
effective communication rates while minimising operational constraints. Mean-
while, LLC-based covert channels tend to achieve lower severity scores, due to
the necessity of finding congruent addresses as well as the LLC locality. This
shows that future works should emphasise on exploiting system-level resource,
while working on making the communication more robust.
The CVSS scores were computed with the CVSS v3.1 equations [3]. According
to our study, microarchitectural covert channels achieve a medium severity score
ranging from 4.2 to 5.0. It shows that covert channels in IaaS are practical,
that they should not be overlooked, and that suitable countermeasures should
be devised in the short term in order to tackle timing channel vulnerabilities.
More specifically, we suggest addressing the DRAM row-buffer and memory bus
covert channels, as cache-based covert and side channel attacks have already
been extensively studied.
When comparing the two evaluation frameworks, we observe that the CCSS
outlines disparities among covert channel attacks which the CVSS does not. For
example, the works proposed by Ristenpart el al. [22] and Wu et al. [30] would
both be rated as medium severity vulnerabilities under the CVSS. Yet, the former
attack has significant shortcomings including obtaining privileges (C9), achiev-
ing core-level co-location (C11), finding congruent addresses (C12), and a low
communication speed. Thus the resulting CVSS scoring of the covert channel
proposed by Ristenpart et al. [22] as a medium severity vulnerability is not ade-
quate. In comparison, the proposed evaluation framework successfully highlights
the benefit of one covert channel over another, with respective scores of 1.6 and
6.7. This shows that the evaluation of microarchitectural covert channels cannot
be performed entirely based on the current industry standard, and that the cri-
teria studied in the CCSS should be accounted for when devising new cross-VM
covert channel attacks. Authors of future covert channels are encouraged to use
the CCSS in order to provide a fair and realistic point of comparison with other
works.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the Covert Channel Scoring System (CCSS) as a new
framework for evaluating microarchitectural covert channels. It allows comparing
covert channel attacks based both on their performance (speed and robustness)
and their practicality (operational constraints). The analysis revealed that the
fastest covert channels are not necessarily the most eminent attacks, as they
usually assume a close locality between sender and receiver, or a complex ini-
tialisation phase, resulting in lower severity scores. We advocate future works to
use the CCSS in order to include a fair comparison metric in their proposal.
Furthermore, we systematically evaluated microarchitectural covert channels
in the Infrastructure-as-a-Service ecosystem, using the Common Vulnerability
Scoring System in its latest version (CVSS v3.1), and revealing medium severity
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scores ranging from 4.2 to 5.0. In comparison, the OpenSSL Heartbleed vulner-
ability achieved a severity score of 7.5 (CVSS v3.1). Although not as severe, the
microarchitectural covert channel threat to IaaS is present and not negligible.
In parallel, services built on cloud computing continue offering guarantees on
the confidentiality and integrity of their customers’ data. The loss of data, e.g.
under GDPR requirement, could result in dramatic consequences for the cloud
provider, the software provider, and their customers.
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